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Abstract. In recent years, security in Information Systems (IS) has become an 
important issue, and needs to be taken into account in all stages of IS 
development, including the early phase of Requirement Engineering (RE).  
Recent studies proposed some useful approaches for security requirements 
definition but analysts still suffer from a considerable lack of knowledge about 
security and domain field. Ontologies are known to be wide sources of 
knowledge. We propose in this research to include ontologies into the 
requirements engineering process.  Ontologies are factors in achieving success 
in requirements elicitation of high quality. 
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1   Introduction 
Security for Information Systems (IS) has progressively become a very broad 
research field. It is no longer limited to classical virus attacks. Information assurance, 
security and privacy have moved from being considered by IS designers as technical 
topics of interest to become critical management issues [1]. Recall that security is 
defined as a discipline [2] which allows one to build reliable systems that can face 
malices, errors or mischiefs [3]. The British Standards Institution defined it as the 
protection of assets from a wide range of threats [4] which are of various origins: 
accidental or intentional, natural, human or technical [5]. The concept of IS security 
also encompasses a set of methods, techniques and tools in charge of protecting the 
resources of an IS to ensure information availability, confidentiality, integrity, and 
traceability. Elahi [6] provides a set of concepts that security includes: an attacker 
performs intentional actions without justification to break a system by exploiting a 
vulnerability. A vulnerability (flaw) is considered as a property of the system or 
environment which, in conjunction with an attack, can lead to a safety failure. An 
asset is defined as something valuable in an organization. Assets are subject to 
attacks. Risk equals threat times vulnerability divided by countermeasures. The 
countermeasures are sets of actions implemented in prevention of the threat.  
A requirement prescribes a property judged necessary for the system; requirements 
engineering verifies that the requirements for a system are defined, managed and 
tested systematically [7]. Security RE frameworks derive security requirements using 
security specific concepts, borrowed from security engineering paradigm.  
Despite existing methodologies in the field [8],[9],[10] most requirements 
engineers are poorly trained to define security requirements. This is due to a 
considerable lack of knowledge about security on one hand and about the field of 
business activity on the other hand. 
  An ontology, in the field of knowledge representation, is most often defined as “a 
representation of a conceptualization” [11]. It should  represent a shared 
conceptualization in order to have any useful purpose [12]. Ontologies are useful for 
representing and interrelating many types of knowledge. Several security ontologies 
have been proposed [13], [14], [12]. Domain ontologies are formal descriptions of 
classes of concepts and relationships between these concepts that describe a given 
domain. The question we ask, is about the usefulness of ontologies for defining 
security requirements? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section addresses the 
problem of our research. Section 3 presents our proposal: the approach, related work 
and expected results. Finally Section 4 provides an update on the work progress and 
future work.  
2  Problem statement  
Security requirements are known to be difficult to identify, to express, to elicit, and 
to manage. Surveying security-related modeling notations and security requirements 
frameworks (Secure Tropos [9], Secure i* [10], abuse cases [15], misuse cases [16], 
UMLSec [17], SecureUML [18], reveals challenges for developing secure software 
systems. Some of them (UMLSec and SecureUML) address security in system-
oriented terms, and do not support the modeling and analysis of security  at an 
organizational level. They are designed to model computer systems and access control 
mechanisms and not for security requirements. Sometimes they turn out to be partial 
and do not model all security aspects like in [18].  Some others (Secure i* and Secure 
Tropos) seem to treat general issues of security and do not cover the security for a 
particular domain. The process proposed for the definition of requirements is 
incomplete or does not exist. Elahi pointed out in [6] that existing proposals do not 
consider potential conflicts between security and other functional and non-functional 
requirements. In current practice, the interaction of security requirements with other 
design objectives and goals of stakeholders are not analyzed, if any security 
requirement is gathered at all.  
Moreover, it appears that with the growing need to implement IT security measures 
in world-wide corporate environments and the growing application scope, a major 
obstacle facing ordinary analysts and developers using existing security requirements 
modeling and analyzing frameworks is the lack of security and domain knowledge 
and expertise. Recent studies have shown that their lack of information security 
knowledge at the management level is one reason for inadequate or non-existing 
information security management strategies and that raising management information 
security awareness and knowledge level leads to more effective strategies.  
To fill this gap, a major portion of research and practical development in security 
software engineering is dedicated to developing security ontologies and knowledge 
bases. However, it still remains difficult for designers to extract relevant pieces of 
knowledge and apply it to their specific analysis design of security requirements. 
Several security ontologies have been proposed [27]. They vary in their degree of 
generality (business level) and specificity (technical level). They also vary in their 
coverage of security aspects. Some focus more on vulnerabilities, while others are 
dedicated to threats, or counter-measures, etc.. In addition, some domain ontologies 
exist in the literature, eg for medical, banking, aviation and maritime. 
We propose to explore the use of security and domain ontologies to define a new 
guiding approach in the elicitation, analysis and validation of security requirements 
for a specific domain. How ? Will this be an interesting solution to cover lacks in the 
definition of security requirements complete, consistent and unambiguous? are the 
research questions we face. We want to test three main hypotheses: that (H1) the 
definition of security requirements can be performed using a phased approach in 
analogy to the definition of functional requirements, that (H2) security and domain 
ontologies are useful at each stage of the process, and (H3) the defined method will be 
better than existing methods, especially through the use of ontologies. 
3  Proposed theory 
As noted in Section 2, some efforts have already been started in the security 
requirement engineering domain, particularly with analysis and modeling 
methodologies, but important issues remain open and must be considered. In particular, 
a real lack of knowledge about security and domain at different development levels 
leaves these proposals useless. Our goal is to take advantage of the existing security 
and domain ontologies, and propose mechanisms and techniques to use them in an 
approach that guides the definition and analysis of security requirements for a 
particular domain of activity.  
3.1   The proposed approach  
 
Figure 1.  The proposed framework for the definition of security requirements.  
The proposed approach is based on the steps in [19] for the development of 
requirements, but adapts them for the definition of security requirements. We  
explores the use of security and domain ontologies in each steps. Figure 1 gives a 
general view of the proposed approach. In the core, we find the Information Systems 
(IS) of a given organization, characterized by its human, physical and informational 
elements (Assets). It is exposed to various threats that exploit vulnerabilities in the 
system. The figure represents around the IS the four steps (elicit, analyze, specify, and 
validate) to follow for the elaboration of the target security requirement document. 
 
• Security requirements elicitation:  
 During the elicitation step, security problems are figured out, investigations about 
stakeholders needs and objectives in terms of security are obtained.    
In this step, we suggest to rely on questionnaires, interviews and workshops with 
stakeholders, to inspect security documents of the field (nomenclature, regulations, 
etc..), and even to conduct direct observations on-site.   Identify actors and potential 
malicious actors, vulnerabilities, potential threats, assets of the organization, and 
imagine some countermeasures for them.  
The output should be a first set of textual security requirements and corresponding 
business models (using i* for example).  
 
• Security requirements analysis:  
The analysis step aims to refine and restructure security requirements collected during 
the previous step. Here we plan to introduce security and domain ontologies to enrich, 
by defining a set of rules and use of mechanisms of ontological mapping, reasoning 
mechanisms, and queries on the ontologies, the set of textual security requirements 
and corresponding models. In this step the ontologies will be very helpful to the 
analyst who lacks knowledge about security and domain.   
 
 - Example of an enrichment rule of the security requirements model through the 
use of a security ontology:   
 
 Given a security ontology (SO), controls (Cont) in the security ontology are sets of 
actions implemented in prevention of a threat that exploits a vulnerability (Vul). Thus, 
if a control is implemented, the security attributes (SA) (confidentiality, integrity or 
availability) are maintained and the assets are protected from different threats 
(Threat). In an i* model, a task (T) is an activity that will accomplish a security 
softgoal (SG).  
 In Fig 2., a partial of an i* model shows that a company has as a goal to provide 
maritime materials to the master of a ship, and has as a security softgoal to ensure the 
integrity these materials. On the left a partial of a security ontology describes that a 
security attribute (integrity) is affected by the threat (Damage_Asset) which exploits a 
vulnerability (InsufficientTrainingOfMaintenanceAndAdministrativeStaff), this 
vulnerability is mitigated by the control 
(TrainingOfMaintenanceAndAdministrativeStaff).      
Thus the security softgoal Integrity is mapped to the corresponding ontological 
element, here the security attribute Integrity in the i* model. (We consider that lexical 
matching and keyword matching using thesauruses in the area of information retrieval 
are some of the techniques).  
We verify if the security attribute is affected by a threat, thanks the property     
IsAffectedBy(Integrity,Damage_Asset), and that the threat exploits a vulnerability: 
Exploits(Damage_Asset,InsufficuentTrainingOfMaintenanceAndAdministrativeStaff)
,and that the vulnerability is mitigated by a control: 
MitigatedBy(InsufficientTrainingOfMaintenanceAndAdministrativeStaff, 
TrainingOfMaintenanceAndAdministrativeStaff) exists in the security ontology. 
 
The control in the security ontology can therefore be added as a task in the i* 













Figure 2.  Example of the use of the security ontology in the analysis of security requirements 
As an illustration, the ControltoTask rule is defined bellow:   
 
If   IsAffectedBy (SA, Threat) 
AND  Exploits(Threat,Vul) 
AND  MitigatedBy(Vul,Cont) 
AND  Mapped_element(SA,SG) 
THEN Create Task (Cont) 
     Create Link (MeansEnd,Cont,SG) 
endif; 
• Security requirements specification:      
This step consist in documenting the requirements in a sustainable and effective way 
for all project stakeholders (developers, testers, customers, etc...)   
Once more, we suggest that this step rely on the use of ontologies: generic security 
ontologies for the problem domain requirements, and technical ones for the solution 
domain security requirements. 
 
 
• Security requirements validation:   
Finally, during the last step, stakeholders review the defined security requirements. 
Then they are tested with a prototype. Then a validation is conducted of the quality 
attributes of the defined security requirements (consistency, correctness, 
completeness, verifiability) based on the security requirement document.   
3.2 Related work  
The RE community has started to be aware of the problem of security in the last years 
and a lot of security RE approaches have been developed:  
 
• Object oriented approaches: or UML extensions, such as UML profiles (SecureUML 
[18], UMLSec[17]), Usecases  (MisuseCases [16], AbuseCases [15], Security Use 
Cases [20]).  
• Goal and agent approaches: such as extended i* [10], extended KAOS [8]  and 
extended Tropos [9]. 
• Risk analysis based approaches [21] and [22]. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, none of these approaches considered the use of security 
ontologies in the development process. In a closely related context, some approaches 
used ontologies in the definition of requirements in [23] and [24], [25],[26]. However, 
these propositions don't deal with security at all, or deal with it in a general way, and 
do not cover security aspects such as threats, vulnerabilities or countermeasures, 
moreover, none of them was dedicated to use ontologies for definition of security 
requirements for a specific domain.  
3.3 Expected outcome  
This research aims to propose a new evolutionary and equipped approach, for 
guidance in the definition of security requirements. The principal feature lies in the 
use of extracted knowledge, of security and domain ontologies. The approach will 
guide the analyst designer by providing ontologies, a tool and mechanisms to extract 
relevant knowledge to apply it to his analysis of security requirements. The desired 
outcome is a better definition of security requirements. Thus, we strive to define 1) 
the steps of the method 2) the elements required to complete each step well 3), 
deliverables associated with each step 4) the rules guiding the analyst in charge of the 
step 5) elements of validation of the end of each step. Then we specify the 
specification document of the tool that supports the method for which we will build a 
prototype. The method and the tool will be validated through the maritime case study. 
4  Progress  
This project research is located at the intersection of three major scientific domains: 
requirement engineering, knowledge engineering and security engineering. 
The first step was to understand the security domain (the target of our research) by 
gathering related definitions. Then we built a state of the art of different researches 
and proposals of the two domains requirements and ontologies for security 
requirement definition. We studied most of the security requirement approaches (12 
approaches)  and classified them into three families (object-oriented, agent and goal 
oriented, risk analysis oriented), and how each approach models security requirements 
(concepts, process, advantages and limitations). We also studied the quality of a lot of 
existing security ontologies (23 security ontologies) and classified them into eight 
families (theoretical basis, taxonomies, general, specific, risk based, web oriented, for 
security requirements, modeling). Moreover, we examined how each ontology of 
security covers security aspects (security objectives, assets, vulnerabilities, threats, 
counter-measures, organization), and whether it is used for requirements engineering 
[27]. This work of literature review is still in progress. As discussed in Section 3.2, 
some contributions deal with similar problems, but the bibliography indicates that no 
current approach is able to tackle every part of our problem.  
  
 Since the RE domain is very large and varied, we have tried to focus only on our 
main interests. We investigated mainly the goal-oriented and security driven modeling 
RE approaches, and up to now mainly the generic security ontologies.  
 
We have extensively explored a case study associated with the maritime domain. 
We conducted interviews with stakeholders in this domain. A first draft of security 
requirements has been collected, requirements models were developed based on 
interviews and analysis of certain documents on maritime security. We are currently 
testing the incorporation of security ontologies in the process of defining requirements 
by relying on this case study which is rich in terms of security issues. We plan to 
validate our methodology by a contolled experience, and validate the resulting 
requirements with experts from security, domain and methods fields.  
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